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Abstract 
European railways have been shaped by multiple reforms since the mid-1990s, covering 
industry structure, market opening and economic regulation. However, the literature has given little 
attention to the latter; namely the evolution and impacts of economic regulation amongst Europe’s 
railways. This paper fills this gap by providing an up-to-date, bottom-up assessment of current rail 
regulatory practice in Europe. We develop a survey of economic regulators across Europe, which 
complements top-down studies by enabling a richer insight into regulatory activity and its impacts. 
The questionnaire is based on a review of the literature on ideal regulatory characteristics. Our results 
indicate that European rail regulators, in general, exhibit many of the features of ideal regulation; in 
particular, independence, resourcing, longevity and expertise, transparency and in turn stability and 
predictability. However, we find that regulatory bodies could take a more proactive role in shaping 
track access charges, given their importance in respect of efficient use of the network and maintaining 
non-discriminatory access. Importantly, there is scope for regulators to play a greater role in 
regulating the efficiency and quality of infrastructure managers, and potentially becoming more 
involved in the designing stages of passenger market opening as it emerges.  
Highlights 
 Unique, up-to-date survey of rail regulatory practice in Europe 
 Bottom-up approach complements previous, top-down econometric methods 
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 Theoretical basis to the survey: review of ideal regulatory characteristics 
 Finds positive correspondence between rail regulatory practice and ideal regulation 
 Increased efficiency and market opening role suggested for regulators 
Keywords 
Regulation, Railways, Competition, Cost, Structure 
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1. Introduction 
Among the European railway reforms implemented from the 1990s, the introduction, renewal 
and strengthening of regulatory roles have been of primary importance. Given the aim of the 
European Commission to turn around the previously stagnating performance of railways through 
stimulating competition, strong regulation is needed to allow the successful implementation of the 
reform programme. The natural monopoly element of the infrastructure requires regulation to ensure 
that it is cost efficient and delivers the required investment and quality of network. Its prices (for 
access to the infrastructure) should also be set in accordance with economic principles and it is crucial 
that new entrants can gain fair access to the infrastructure in order to stimulate competition (non-
discrimination). Regulatory reform therefore also goes hand in hand with the Commission’s 
legislation targeting vertical separation (either with infrastructure and operations in separate legal 
entities, or at least in separate divisions of the same parent company). To play an effective role, 
economic regulators need to be independent both of government (given its role as funder and owner 
of the incumbent rail operator and infrastructure managers in most EU countries) and railway 
companies. 
Nevertheless, these regulatory reforms have attracted little attention in the literature on the 
impacts of railway reforms, which has concentrated much more on structural and market 
interventions. Those studies that have looked at the impact of regulatory reforms in Europe have 
focused on top-down econometric methods, introducing regulatory variables into an econometric cost 
function. Some studies have adopted relatively simple measures of regulation (i.e. dummy variables 
capturing the presence or not of an independent economic regulator (e.g. Wetzel, 2008)). Smith et al. 
(2015), build on this approach by introducing a multi-dimensional regulation index into a translog 
cost system.  
Smith et al. (2015) demonstrate that over the period of their sample – 2002-2011 – the 
strength of economic regulation in Europe’s railways increased considerably, as measured by their 
regulation index, which extracts the regulatory related aspects of the Rail Liberalisation Index reports 
(IBM and Kirchner, 2002, 2004, 2007 and 2011). Over that time the reforms had a beneficial impact 
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on costs, particularly when combined with vertical separation. However, even this improvement was 
not considered adequate by the European Commission, which set out further reforms in the 2012 
Recast of the First Railway Package (European Parliament and Council Directive 2012/34/EC, 
“Recast” hereafter). These reforms focused particularly on ensuring regulatory independence (from 
government) and giving regulators increased powers (see Smith et al., 2015). 
A clear gap in the literature, therefore, is an up-to-date (post 2012 Recast), in-depth, bottom-
up documentation and assessment of rail regulatory practice in Europe, which is the focus of this 
paper. We undertake such an appraisal through a survey of economic regulators across Europe, thus 
complementing previous top-down, econometric studies. In particular, it allows a richer insight into 
regulatory activity and the mechanisms by which regulators are influencing (or not) the activities of 
firms and the resulting impacts on final outcomes in the sector.  
The novelty of this paper can be summarised as follows. Firstly, our study of the regulatory 
role expands on the analysis of previous studies in order to account not only for the independence of 
the regulators (the focus of most previous work, with the exception of Smith et. al., 2015), but also for 
the increasing number of powers assigned to these bodies. These regulatory trends are analysed in 
order to capture potential patterns at the European level. Secondly, for this purpose, an extensive 
review of what best describes an “ideal rail regulator” is carried out. The findings of this literature 
review crucially inform the design of a questionnaire sent to industry actors, ensuring updated first-
hand evidence on the current trends regarding rail regulation. Survey-based approaches for examining 
regulatory frameworks have previously been used in transport (e.g. Beria et al., 2015, for motorways). 
Thirdly, our qualitative, bottom-up approach complements the top-down econometric analysis carried 
out in Smith et al. (2015) as noted. Finally, our work brings the analysis of regulatory activity up-to-
date, covering the period post the 2012 Recast. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 first explains the rationale for 
rail regulation in more detail, before summarising the relevant European legislation. Section 3 
includes a review of the literature on what constitutes an “ideal economic regulatory body” in 
railways. The related findings are key to the design of the questionnaire on the role of rail regulation, 
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described in Section 4, together with details on the participants and collection of data. Results 
emerging from the questionnaire are reported and discussed in Section 5, and concluding remarks are 
presented in Section 6. 
2. Background on legislation on rail regulators 
This section is divided into two parts. We first set out the rationale for regulating Europe’s 
railways. In the second part we briefly review the relevant European legislation pertaining to rail 
regulation. 
2.1 Why regulate Europe’s railways? 
Regulation might be expected to play an important role in railway markets for several 
reasons. The implementation of vertical separation in a number of European countries involves the 
emergence of important interactions occurring between disjointed interfaces, namely the infrastructure 
managers on one side, and the railway undertakings on the other. These interactions are typically 
related to investment strategies, capacity allocation and timetabling, as well as real-time operations, 
creating an interdependent environment for railway undertakings, infrastructure managers and (at 
times) governments. Here we use the term vertical separation to mean full, legal separation of rail 
infrastructure from train operations. The intermediate position, the “holding company” model, has 
also been adopted in several European countries, and refers to a situation where infrastructure and 
operations are organised into separate divisions within the same parent group.  
If with vertical integration (and to some extent with the holding company model), transaction 
costs are argued to be small because the interactions are between entities sharing the same business 
interests, with vertical separation these costs are likely to reach greater levels, since the parties 
involved are placed on opposing positions, and the possibility of reaching compromises is inevitably 
reduced. It should be noted that whilst direct transaction costs may be small in railways (see Merkert 
et al., 2012), the greater problem probably lies in the costs associated with misaligned incentives and 
the (perhaps bad) decisions resulting from this (see van de Velde et al., 2012). In this scenario, 
regulators could act as impartial third parties, attempting to minimise transaction costs and the 
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associated wider problems of misalignment of incentives. To be effective, the regulatory role should 
be independent of governmental or, more generally, political influence, when the negotiations involve 
railway undertakings or network managers controlled (directly or indirectly) by government. 
In these unbundled contexts, regulators can also help improve rail system efficiency. 
Infrastructure managers in separated systems may be less incentivised to be efficient in contrast with 
more integrated models, where the efficiency achieved by the infrastructure managers has wider 
implications for the financial performance of the parent group. In separated models, this shared 
interest tends to fade, and here the regulator may need to step in to exert the necessary pressure on 
infrastructure managers. This potential role of the regulator is also envisaged by the Recast (section 
2.2). This sees regulators potentially playing a greater role in incentivising and enforcing improved 
efficiency and quality performance.   
Whilst the control of infrastructure managers’ performance and efficiency produces direct 
effects on costs on the part of the regulators, monitoring non-discrimination and promoting and 
strengthening competitive conditions impact indirectly on the efficiency of a railway system. Through 
the resolution of disputes on competition and, more generally, the prevention of practices deviating 
from this objective, regulators might play a role in ensuring that potentially more efficient players are 
allowed to enter the railway arena, thus also putting pressure on the incumbent to become more 
efficient. However, to date, whilst there has been competition in freight markets in Europe, this has 
been much less prevalent in passenger markets. 
Institutionally, in order to obtain these goals, three rail regulatory models have been 
developed in Europe (see IBM Business Consulting Services, 2006; Crozet et al., 2012): the ministry 
model (Model 1), the railway authority model (Model 2), and the special regulatory authority model 
(Model 3). While Model 1 was made illegal by the Recast (see section 2.2), Model 2 has gradually 
lost popularity in favour of Model 3, now utilised in 20 countries, as opposed to 7 countries in 2006 
(IBM Business Consulting Services, 2006).  
2.2 Overview of rail regulation legislation in Europe 
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Railway reforms implemented since the mid-1990s have covered multiple and diverse 
aspects, focusing on the structure, regulation, and competitive conditions of the market. From a 
legislative point of view, this stimulus has produced Three Railway Packages1, one Recast and the 
proposal for a Fourth Railway Package (COM, (2013) 25, final). This section concentrates on those 
legislative acts altering regulatory positions, and in particular the Recast. 
In 2012, the Recast determined an important legislative break-through, attempting to resolve 
many problems in European regulatory practice (see Smith et al., 2015). Particular problems included 
the scarce level of competition faced by national incumbents, inadequate regulatory independence and 
powers, and modest investment in railway infrastructure, with associated infrastructure quality issues. 
Specifically, competences were extended in order to cover the access to and charging for 
railway services (Article 56), political independence was reinforced to ensure that regulators were no 
longer residing within transport ministries (Article 55) and impactful activities such as investigations 
reinvigorated (Article 57). Importantly, new powers associated with the monitoring and enforcement 
of infrastructure managers’ performance and efficiency were granted2, providing the regulators with 
the possibility to require relevant data (Article 56).  
Given the above, extensive regulatory developments, it is important to determine how far the 
legislation is being implemented in practice. Before turning to discuss our survey method, we first 
consider what an ideal regulator might look like, based on the literature. This review, together with 
the provisions of the Recast, provides the basis for the questions included in our survey.  
3. Literature review on ideal rail regulator characteristics 
                                                     
1 First Railway Package: European Parliament and Council Directives 2001/12/EC, 2001/13/EC and 
2001/14/EC.  
Second Railway Package: European Parliament and Council Directives 2004/49/EC, 2004/50/EC, 2004/51/EC 
and Regulation (EC) No.881/2004.  
Third Railway Package: European Parliament and Council Directives 200758/EC, 2007/59/EC and Regulations 
(EC) Nos. 1370/2007, 1371/2007, 1372/2007. 
2 Though the legislation states that this role could also be carried out instead via a multi-annual contract between 
infrastructure managers and governments. 
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The regulatory role in rail implies multiple characteristics that have been little analysed by the 
literature. In order to close this gap, this section will provide a review of those characteristics which 
may be considered ideal for a rail (or transport) regulator. 
Starting with general regulation theory, Fleck (2000) argues that the emphasis should not be 
placed on the automatic creation of bodies which elsewhere have guaranteed the success of the 
reforms, but on their staggered establishment depending on the different development stages of a 
particular system. This implies that a railway regulator may not be required until the market has 
reached a certain level of competition. The relevance of the context in regulation is also stressed by 
Gassner and Pushak (2014), who point out the necessity to adapt regulatory structures to the 
economic, political and sectoral conditions in which the agency would operate. Relevantly, this paper 
aims to embody context within the analysis wherein various different national characteristics coexist. 
Specifically to railways, an important study was produced following an OECD Round Table 
discussion of experts on the role of economic regulators (OECD/ITF, 2011). Central in these 
references is the focus on the significance of independence, which in turn depends on several factors. 
One of the primary objects of the regulator should be the pursuit of non-discrimination, connected 
with situations in which particular operators enjoy advantageous conditions for the access to relevant 
infrastructure. To achieve this, the regulator needs to be provided with appropriate human and 
financial resources and be accountable for its decisions (and its role and responsibilities need to be 
distinct from those of government or other agencies); and to guarantee independence from 
government, regulators should be totally separate from transport ministries. The way the regulator 
reaches its goals is ideally transparent, publicly displaying the process and the results that substantiate 
decisions. Minimising the frequency of modifications in relation to infrastructure or transport 
services, and avoiding bowing to short-term political aims, confers stability and predictability. In 
addition, an ideal regulator would be able to intervene on issues on its own initiative (and not only on 
request), thereby growing autonomous capabilities. Lastly, and observing another network industry 
like telecommunications (OECD, 2000), regulatory oversight is better achieved by a collegiate body 
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(i.e. a board) rather than by a single person, and the related members should maintain their roles only 
for fixed terms.  
In addition to the key requirements for independence from government, the Recast now 
confers on rail regulators powers regarding the monitoring of access to and charging system of the 
pertaining railway market, with a view to generating adequate levels of contestability and 
competition. Also, the possibility of requesting data and information on accounting documentation, 
track access charges and financial performance of the infrastructure managers is configured as a 
relevant regulatory power. The formalisation of an effective sanctioning scheme should be seen as 
essential as well. 
Some of the above aspects have also been investigated by the Rail Liberalisation Index 
reports produced by IBM and Kirchner (2002, 2004, 2007 and 2011). These studies examine the state 
of the liberalisation processes in European countries, constructing indices and formulating rankings. 
Some of the drivers selected by those authors attest the adequacy of the previously described findings, 
such as the general aspects of the authority (including elements like independence, accountability and 
transparency), the object of the regulation (for instance, the responsibilities deriving from different 
types of inspections), and its powers (involving the possibility of imposing coercive means). Another 
important study on rail regulation was produced in 2006 (IBM Business Consulting Services, 2006), 
where a survey was conducted in order to assess the regulatory conditions of rail network access in 
Europe. The areas therein investigated (such as general powers, scope and organisational aspects of 
the regulators) are also covered in our survey, which aims to update those results by accounting for 
developments during the last decade, as well as complementing the research on this field by including 
those characteristics describing an ideal rail regulator. 
The above discussion on the key features of an ideal rail regulator inform our questionnaire 
(see section 4), ultimately targeting the following research questions. How are European rail 
regulators performing in terms of these ideal characteristics? What are the current regulatory trends 
characterising European railway systems?  
4. Questionnaire design and data 
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The structure of the questionnaire, based on the above literature review, is set out below 
(Table 1). The 8 key areas reflecting the literature on what represents an ideal regulator are listed in 
column 1, and detailed in column 2. Column 3 highlights which participants (regulators and/or 
regulatees3) were involved in relation to the 8 key areas. The first key area, related to the regulator’s 
position in the rail system, captures two aspects. First, the degree of experience, and in turn 
commitment, of the regulator, which is argued to be one of the ideal characteristics. Focus is therefore 
placed on the longevity of the regulator and major changes in its responsibilities in recent years. The 
second aspect is concerned with gaining information on the extent of competition in the relevant 
railway markets (this provides contextual information, rather than being concerned with ideal 
characteristics).   
 
Table 1 Key areas of the questionnaire 
Key areas Purposes Addressed to 
  Regulators Regulatees 
1. Positioning in the market Historical evolution of the regulator 
and competition levels of passenger 
sub-markets 
  
2. Stability and predictability Legislative and operational 
independence from government 
and other bodies, while promoting 
conditions for long-term planning 
  
3. Non-discrimination Ensuring fair access for operators 
when accessing the infrastructure   
4. Distinct responsibilities Avoiding overlapping of roles and 
accountability between regulator 
and government (or other agencies) 
  
5. Human and financial resources Appropriate means to meet 
regulatory objectives   
6. Transparency Ensuring the accountability of the 
regulator   
7. Pro-activity and effectiveness The extent of autonomous powers 
for investigations and interventions   
8. System efficiency Accessing and analysing data on 
infrastructure managers’ quality 
and efficiency 
  
 
                                                     
3 The sub-set of regulatees includes infrastructure managers and railway undertakings. 
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In relation to stability and predictability (area 2), the questions specifically investigate the 
regulator (or regulatory board) terms of appointment and decision making processes. The number of 
board members, the duration of appointment and potential re-appointment, and the voting system 
implemented in order to take decisions are examined, together with questions on whether 
governmental guidance affects the regulator’s decisions and independence. 
Non-discrimination (area 3) represents a broad key area of regulatory activity. Here the 
questionnaire explores the existence and extent of discriminatory situations connected with several 
railway aspects (such as track; rolling stock; highly specialised staff).  The capability of the regulator 
to respond to these problems is assessed, as well as the number of complaints received. A further 
section includes the analysis of framework agreements, attempting to establish both their proportion 
in respect to total capacity and which operators are involved. 
The fourth key area pertains to the distinction of responsibilities between the regulator and the 
government (or other agencies): here questions investigate the connections between railway 
undertakings and the body (or bodies) issuing licences, safety certificates and vehicles certificates, 
and on the degree of independence of the regulator from political influence in respect of these matters. 
The adequacy of available human and financial resources is explored in the fifth key area. 
Questions here assess the number and backgrounds of the staff employed by the regulatory agency 
and attempt to detect which actors contribute to funding the regulatory activities, also exploring 
whether these financial contributions are deemed sufficient. 
The sixth key area, on transparency, consists of questions on the clear and public specification 
of regulatory decisions and processes. These involve diverse aspects, including the regulator’s 
competence and powers, the issuing of licences, safety certificates and homologation (approval) of 
vehicles, and the allocation of capacity (together with the related conflicts resolution). 
Within pro-activity and effectiveness, regulatory powers on the approval of track access 
charging schemes are examined. Further queries concern the legal and financial effects of regulatory 
decisions, determining whether these are binding and whether regulators are able to impose penalties. 
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The last key area refers to important powers conferred on regulators by the Recast, especially 
in relation to the identification of any regulatory or other mechanisms in place to incentivise 
efficiency. Questions attempt to define the role played by regulators in monitoring and enforcing the 
quality and efficiency of the infrastructure managers’ performance, as well as whether data on cost-
efficiency and quality of service can be accessed. 
The questionnaire was sent to regulators, infrastructure managers, and railway undertakings.  
Two versions of the questionnaire were designed: one for regulators, and one for infrastructure 
managers and railway undertakings. These versions differ in terms of the individual questions (or 
whole key areas) selected, whose exclusion or inclusion seek to avoid uninformed answers and to 
prevent potentially biased responses. This can be seen in respect to the questions on regulatory board 
terms of appointment and structure, only addressed to regulators, as the regulatees may not be able to 
possess the relevant information on those points. Biased responses could emerge in relation to the 
independence of political influence or transparency-related queries: it appears intuitive that regulators 
may overestimate the level of independence of political influence or transparency of their processes 
and decisions, while the set of potential regulatees may provide more realistic answers. This 
dichotomous approach importantly involves counterparties which interact with conflicting interests 
and thereby are able to offer objective information. 
Moving to the list of participants involved, contacts were obtained from the Community of 
European Railway and Infrastructure Companies (CER) Economics Group and the Independent 
Regulators’ Group - Rail (IRG) Charges Working Group. Presentations took place in order to describe 
the project to both groups and 17 regulators were eventually contacted, obtaining 14 responses, which 
correspond to a highly satisfactory 82% response rate. The focus of the remainder of the paper is 
mostly placed on the regulators’ responses as the participation of infrastructure managers and railway 
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undertakings was limited, with the latter confined to incumbents rather than new entrants4. The full 
list of regulators who provided their responses is displayed in Table 2. 
A note on the methodological approach needs to be made. Given the confidentiality of the 
information provided, the related assessment is not aimed to single out individual countries, but on 
identifying general Europe-wide trends from an aggregate examination of the findings. This 
examination is extensively presented in the following Section. 
Table 2 List of participating regulators 
Country Regulatory body 
Belgium Regulatory Service for Railway Transport and for Brussels Airport 
Operations 
Finland Finnish Transport Safety Agency 
France Autorité de régulation des activités ferroviaires et Routières 
Germany Bundesnetzagentur 
Greece Regulatory Authority for Railways 
Italy Autorità di Regolazione dei Trasporti 
Luxembourg Institut Luxembourgeois de Régulation 
Netherlands Authority for Consumers & Markets 
Norway Norwegian Railway Authority 
Poland Office for Rail Transport 
Slovenia Post and Electronic Communications Agency of the Republic of 
Slovenia 
Sweden Swedish Transport Agency 
Switzerland Railways Arbitration Commission 
United Kingdom Office of Rail and Road 
 
Finally, the questionnaire was sent out in October 2014 and all responses were received by August 
2015. 
 
                                                     
4 The following 6 infrastructure managers and railway undertakings responded to the questionnaire: ÖBB-
Holding AG from Austria; NMBS / SNCB from Belgium; VR-Group Ltd from Finland; Ferrovie dello Stato 
Italiane S.p.A. from Italy; Polish State Railways – JSC from Poland; and SBB AG from Switzerland. 
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5. Results and discussion 
A summary of selected regulators’ responses is provided in Table 3. Regulators’ responses 
will be predominantly illustrated as the regulatees’ responses tend to confirm the evidence of the 
regulators. For areas 4 and 6, for the reasons set out, these questions were only asked to regulatees 
(hence they do not appear in Table 3), and their responses are discussed in the text for these areas. 
The positioning in the market (area 1) defines the experience of the regulator and the major 
changes undertaken in recent years. The majority of regulators have accumulated an extended 
operational longevity, at times over 15 years. In particular, 11 regulators out of 14 have more than 5 
years of experience, indicating that these bodies seem to have reached a stable position in the industry 
which, on paper, may have contributed to provide them with an appropriate level of credibility and 
commitment. This is also identifiable by looking at recent changes at national level to regulatory 
responsibilities which, on the basis of the responses received from 11 regulators (out of 14), all point 
to an expansion of the powers of regulators, rather than restricting their remits. 
In terms of the configuration of the passenger market, the related results do not seem to be 
particularly encouraging from the point of view of competition. The proportion of the passenger 
market covered by public service routes (in passenger-km) is on average equal to approximately 
77%5, and direct awards represent the predominant method of allocation: regulators’ responses (from 
14 countries) indicate that in 6 countries, direct awards are the only procedure utilised, while in 
another 2 countries the related implementation is alternate with tendering procedures, which only play 
a marginal role. Only in 2 countries in our sample is competitive tendering the norm. Also, regulators 
only rarely play a role in the designing stages of the tendering procedures. Overall, utilising direct 
awards is argued to restrict the level of contestability by limiting the number of competitors for 
specific public service routes, which instead may be more efficiently allocated by tendering 
procedures. Nevertheless, the choice of formalising a direct award may be due, among other reasons, 
to the lack of newcomers able to rival the incumbent, which is the case for several domestic markets.  
                                                     
5 This question was pre-answered by using 2012 data and, in some cases, was corrected by the regulators with 
more recent information. The differences are not large, confirming a constant trend in this area.  
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Table 3  Summary of selected responses from regulators (covering areas 1-3; 5, 7 and 8) – Sample size: N=14 
Key area Issue Yes No Don’t know Detailed response 
1. Positioning in the 
market 
Experience of regulator 
   
More than 5 
years (11); Less 
than 5 years (3) 
 Procedures for 
allocation of routes 
under public service 
contracts 
  4 
100% direct 
awards (6); 
Direct awards 
and tendering (2); 
100% tendering 
(2) 
 Actual passenger 
competition in routes 
not covered by public 
service contracts 
5 3 2 
Not legally 
permitted (4) 
2. Stability and 
predictability 
Individual regulator or 
regulatory board 
   
Individual 
regulator (7); 
Regulatory board 
(7) 
 Fixed-term 
appointment of 
regulator 
11 3  
 
 Majority voting for 
regulatory board’s 
decisions 
5  2 
Individual 
regulator decides 
(7) 
 Appointment of 
individual regulator or 
members of regulatory 
board 
  2 
By the 
government (10); 
Others (2) 
 Governmental 
guidance on regulatory 
decisions 
1 11 2 
 
3. Non-discrimination Complaints received by 
the regulator (on 
average in a one-year 
period) 
  3 
Less than 5 
complaints per 
year (8); More 
than 5 complaints 
per year (3) 
 Favouring certain RUs 
when disruptions occur 4 9 1 
 
5. Human and 
financial resources 
Number of employees 
  1 
More than 10 (4); 
Less than 10 (9) 
 Adequacy of financial 
resources 10 3 1 
 
7. Pro-activity and 
effectiveness 
Approval of all track 
access charging 
schemes 
5 8 1 
 
 Legally binding 
decisions by regulator 14   
 
 Regulator’s possibility 
of imposing penalties 11 3  
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Key area Issue Yes No Don’t know Detailed response 
8. System efficiency Regulator’s role in 
monitoring and 
enforcing the quality 
and efficiency of the 
infrastructure manager 
4 9 1 
 
 Regulator’s possibility 
of requiring data on 
cost-efficiency and 
quality of service from 
the infrastructure 
manager 
4 7 1 
Individual cases 
(2) 
 Body regulating the 
performance and 
efficiency of the 
infrastructure manager 
  4 
Regulator (1); 
Regulator and 
government (1); 
Government (7); 
Safety authority 
(1) 
 
A further question addressed to regulators concerns the existence of open access conditions 
for non-public service routes in the domestic passenger market, excluding cases where international 
services compete with domestic services. While open access is legally permitted in 8 countries (out of 
14), in only 5 of them does this actually occur, possibly attesting that lack of competitors previously 
mentioned. Moreover, these scenarios also help our understanding of the extent to which regulators 
can indirectly act on promoting competition, an aspect that will be further analysed later. 
The second key area (on stability and predictability) determines how the regulators function 
in terms of appointment, structure and decision-making. The regulators’ sample is equally divided in 
relation to the presence of either an individual regulator (7 countries) or a regulatory board (remaining 
7 countries). The stability of the appointment is guaranteed in 11 countries (fixed-term contracts), 
with an average duration per term equal to approximately 5.45 years. In reality the overall 
appointment may last longer, as these positions are renewable once in 6 countries, and more than once 
in 3 countries. These results seem to suggest the avoidance of frequent modifications on the part of 
regulators, who have the possibility of determining their activities with a long-run perspective. 
Though the picture therefore seems positive here, it should be noted that the possibility of re-
appointment (2 regulators even indicated that no limit exists in the possibility of re-appointment) may 
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determine a prolonged, and potentially detrimental, situation where regulatory power remains in the 
same hands for many years.  
In our sample, the majority of the board members are employed full-time, indicating strong 
regulatory commitment to other industry actors. The boards, on average, consist of 4.5 members. 
Decisions, apart from the 7 cases where an individual regulator is present, are taken by majority 
voting in 5 countries6. The procedure for the board’s appointment is equivalent for most regulators, 
with the government selecting board members in 10 countries (out of 14). These questions lead to the 
examination of how the regulator and the government interact. Only 1 regulator included in the 
sample, when taking decisions, seems to have the obligation to take into account governmental 
guidance: also, from the answers received, governmental instructions appear to be either rare or not 
binding. Naturally, this detachment from political aims represents an important requirement for the 
regulatory autonomy that, according to our results, is widespread across Europe. 
The activities substantiating independence are explored further by looking at the answers on 
non-discrimination issues (area 3), which involved all the participants (regulators and regulatees) to 
different extents. Perhaps surprisingly, infrastructure managers and railway undertakings have not 
detected any discriminatory problems connected to a wide range of railway areas7. It should be noted 
however that the railway undertakings surveyed are incumbents, and potentially suffer to a smaller 
extent from these problems as opposed to newcomers. In addition, regulators’ promptness on tackling 
related problems is considered satisfactory by 4 regulatees (out of 6)8. In reality, this promptness has 
been tested in a very small number of cases in several countries: indeed 8 regulators (out of 14) 
receive less than 5 complaints per year (on average), and 3 of them have indicated that no complaint 
was ever lodged. Nonetheless these responses, by offering a valuable snapshot of the current role 
played by regulators in railways, allow us to appreciate the wider range of powers and activities these 
                                                     
6 This information was not available for 2 countries in which a regulatory board is present. 
7 These are: track, rolling stock, highly specialised staff, use of electrical supply equipment for traction current, 
refuelling facilities, freight terminals, marshalling yards, train formation facilities, storage sidings, depots, 
passenger stations, or any additional area. 
8 In relation to the 2 remaining countries, in one case problems concerning the timeline of the regulatory 
processes were highlighted, while in the other case no information was available. 
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bodies now enjoy, if compared with the limiting conditions observed at the outset of the reforming 
season. 
As mentioned previously, area 3 covers further questions on potential discriminatory issues 
arising from disruptions or when framework agreements are stipulated. The minimisation of 
discriminatory practices seems to emerge when the regulators are asked about the presence of railway 
undertakings somehow favoured in case of disruptions: only 4 regulators (out of 14) indicate this to 
happen, determining a priority treatment especially for passenger transport. Lastly, as documented by 
the responses collected from both regulators and regulatees, framework agreements between the 
infrastructure managers and the railway undertakings are characterised by moderate diffusion across 
Europe: in most of the considered countries a threshold has been determined, but only in 4 countries 
(out of 15, the whole sample of countries involved in the questionnaire9) do framework agreements 
actually cover more than 10% of the overall capacity. Given the possibility for infrastructure 
managers to assign priority to framework agreements when deciding on the allocation of capacity, 
these results seem to attest that potentially discriminatory practices in this field are rather infrequent. 
In general, discrimination does not seem to be considered a problem by the infrastructure managers 
and railway undertakings in our sample, and regulators appear to play a proactive role when the need 
arises (in terms of responses to lodged complaints). It should be noted that our sample does not 
include new entrant railway undertakings who may have given different answers on this question 
The autonomy of the regulators is verified by the responses related to the key area on the 
distinction of responsibilities (area 4), for which only regulatees were questioned. In 5 countries (out 
of 6), collusive relationships between railway undertakings and bodies issuing licences, safety 
certificates and vehicles certifications were absent. For the remaining country, the provided answer is 
inconclusive on this point. Importantly, a general awareness of the independence of the regulator 
appears to emerge: all 6 infrastructure managers and railway undertakings stated that governments do 
                                                     
9 15 is the total number of countries analysed in our questionnaire, taking into account the country of origin of 
all participants. 
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not influence regulatory decisions and are able to identify the source of the regulator’s independence, 
typically determined by the legislation.  
The responses to questions on human and financial resources (area 5) show that, in terms of 
full-time equivalent, 266.8 employees work across 13 countries10 for the regulatory bodies on railway 
economic regulations only (excluding safety and interoperability). Comparing this result with the data 
provided in 2006 by IBM’s report on rail regulation in Europe11 (IBM Business Consulting Services, 
2006), the number of staff employed has nearly doubled: in particular, 3 regulatory bodies which had 
no staff in 2006, have now employed personnel, even though only 4 regulators (out of 14) have more 
than 10 employees. The backgrounds of the personnel are rather diverse, mainly associated with 
economic and legal, but also involving rail industry, engineering and administrative expertise.  
The capability of hiring new staff does, however, seem to be limited for 3 regulators (out of 
14), who indicated inadequate resourcing. These resources derive from two sources: funding is 
provided fully by the government for 8 regulators, fully by the industry for 5, and by both for the 
remaining 1. In general, the majority of regulatory bodies have not indicated problems with the 
amount of human and financial resources available, and the growing trend in the number of staff 
seems to corroborate this. Nevertheless, the financial difficulties affecting 3 regulators are not to be 
underestimated, producing warnings especially for those contexts where government funding may be 
restricted by fiscal constraints.  
The regulators’ efforts on transparency (area 6) have reached appropriate levels, according to 
the responses given by infrastructure managers and railway undertakings only. When asked about the 
transparency of the regulators’ competence and processes, and the procedures for licensing, safety 
certificates, approval of vehicles, and the allocation of capacity, the participants expressed positive 
views, also indicating the sources where the related explanatory documentation is available12. A 
negative area concerns the presence and monitoring of annual reports: the 6 responses from 
                                                     
10 One regulator did not answer to this question. 
11 According to the IBM report, the number of employees involved in rail regulation in 2006 was equal to 144 
(in this sample). Only a part of staff dealt with regulatory issues full-time, but the exact proportion was not 
specified. 
12 Only one participant identified two areas that need better specification. 
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infrastructure managers and railway undertakings suggest that only 2 regulators produce such a report, 
which is checked by an impartial third party only in 1 country. In sum, this deficiency, albeit 
important, does not appear to considerably affect the accountability of the regulator, whose operations 
are characterised by adequate clarity and are publicly detailed. 
Moving to the seventh key area (pro-activity and effectiveness), regulators’ powers turn out to 
be rather limited in respect to track access charging schemes. Only 5 regulators (out of 14) have the 
possibility of approving the totality of these schemes, even though the Recast (Article 56, paragraph 
6) says that the regulatory body shall ensure that charges set by the infrastructure manger comply with 
the principles set out in the Recast. Regulators seem to play an active role only when connected 
complaints are raised and non-discrimination needs to be preserved (as previously highlighted): 
nonetheless this may be rare in those numerous contexts where competition is lacking. This function 
pertaining to the approval of all charging schemes is in need of uniformity across Europe: the lack of 
power in this respect means that regulatory capabilities are not being fully exploited (as attested to 
some extent also by the results emerging in the previous key areas). The relevance of the control over 
the access charges set by the infrastructure manager is particularly important as more newcomers 
enter railway markets. This is corroborated by the literature, as for instance in the work by Álvarez-
SanJaime et al. (2016), who set out an imperfect competition model to study the charges’ effects on 
subsequent competition and demand levels for high speed routes. On the other hand, a positive picture 
emerges regarding the enforcement powers accorded to regulatory decisions: all the regulators (14) 
are able to produce legally binding decisions, and the majority (11) can impose penalties, in most 
cases hitting a certain proportion of the sanctioned company’s turnover. 
A similarly unbalanced trend is identified in the last key area (area 8), where the monitoring 
powers of the regulators are investigated, with particular reference to the activity of the infrastructure 
managers. The position here is, perhaps, unexpected, considering the new powers given by the Recast 
in this area. Only 4 regulators (out of 14) play a role in monitoring the performance (quality of the 
infrastructure) and efficiency of the infrastructure managers, while 3 of these and 1 other can require 
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data to support their regulatory role13. There are only 2 countries in which the agencies (alone or with 
the government) regulate the performance and the efficiency of the infrastructure manager (that is, 
more than simply a monitoring role), as opposed to the alternative situation (7 countries) where 
exclusively the government plays this role through a multi-annual contract, which is present in 11 
countries (out of 15). While diverse activities are in place in a number of countries - covering tasks 
such as audits, investigations, notification of warnings and, in some cases, even the possibility of 
affecting infrastructure managers’ powers - these are argued not to embrace the full range of 
possibilities conferred on regulators by the relevant legislation. Influencing the efficiency and quality 
of infrastructure managers’ performance ultimately produces potential repercussions on costs, access 
charges, competition and demand levels, and this seems to be mainly achieved thanks to the 
enforcement of multi-annual contracts (by governments) around Europe.  
The findings suggest that regulators’ potential has decisively improved in recent years but 
cannot be considered to be fully exploited yet. Further strengthening the powers and role of economic 
regulators would seem to be beneficial, especially in light of the findings in Smith et al. (2015), where 
stronger economic regulation was associated with the improved efficiency performance of European 
railway systems.  Specifically, and based on our survey, we consider that the following areas of 
regulatory activity require particular attention going forward if the full benefits of independent 
regulation are to be captured:  
 Tendering procedures are rarely implemented for the allocation of passenger 
routes covered by public service contracts and, where implemented, regulators only in 
isolated cases seem to be asked to collaborate in the designing stages; 
 The growing diffusion of regulatory boards, as opposed to individual 
regulators, is to be encouraged for the purpose of attaining more shared and better founded 
decisional processes; 
 In view of the growing liberalisation of rail markets across Europe, the 
expanding trend for human and financial resources available to regulators needs to continue; 
                                                     
13 Another 2 regulators can access this data only for individual cases (not as a general practice). 
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 Track access charging schemes are approved by only a small number of 
regulators around Europe, even though regulators’ response seem strong in case of appeals; 
 Similarly, regulators’ role is limited in relation to monitoring and enforcing 
the infrastructure manager’s quality and efficiency. 
Counter-arguments may justify some of these deficiencies. Utilising direct awards instead of 
tendering procedures may be determined by the lack of competitive forces, budgetary constraints may 
limit the allocation of more resources to regulatory operations, and the control of the infrastructure 
managers’ activities may be ensured by the presence of multi-annual contracts between these bodies 
and governments. Indeed, the Recast leaves the decision on whether the regulatory body or the 
government is responsible for exerting pressure to reduce costs with the member states. Nonetheless, 
the empirical results contained in Smith et al. (2015) show that strong regulation plays a role in 
reducing the costs of a railway system. Various strategies may be therefore delineated in order to 
foster this role. Gains in efficiency may arise from reshuffling railway governance arrangements: 
governments seem to play a strong role in many contexts where instead regulatory bodies’ expertise 
may be exploited. Regulatory intervention may be enhanced for the promotion of competition, beyond 
the current activities on non-discrimination and towards the designing of tenders. In addition, 
enforcement of efficient practices on the part of the infrastructure managers may be pursued, carefully 
avoiding duplication with safeguarding mechanisms already envisaged by multi-annual contracts. 
However, there would still appear to be advantages in having the role of incentivising and enforcing 
efficiency improvements played by a body that is independent of government, and this approach is 
generally adopted in economic regulation in the UK for example. 
6. Conclusions 
The framework for economic regulation of Europe’s railways has undergone major reform in 
recent years, particularly after the 2012 Recast. The previous literature assessing the impact of rail 
reforms in Europe has focused mainly on the effects of competition and vertical structure, and has 
paid relatively little attention to regulatory reforms Those approaches did not consider in any depth 
the question of precisely how economic regulation is implemented, or which aspects of the regulatory 
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role are the most developed or most potent. Importantly, the previous literature does not cover the 
period since the critical Recast reforms post-2012. 
This paper develops and complements the previous literature by offering a bottom-up, in-
depth, and up-to-date assessment of the state of economic rail regulation in Europe as of October 
2014. We develop a questionnaire addressed to 14 rail regulators in Europe (additionally to a sample 
of regulatees for specific questions where appropriate; see sections 4 and 5). This approach enabled 
the collection of updated and first-hand evidence on the current status of rail regulation across Europe, 
which is particularly valuable given the key reforms implemented in recent years. The questionnaire 
was based on an extensive review of the literature on what constitutes ideal regulatory characteristics, 
giving our approach a theoretical underpinning.  
We find that a positive narrative emerges in respect of regulatory independence. Ensuring 
independence from government, by taking regulators outside transport ministries, was a key aim of 
the 2012 Recast, and this has been implemented in all cases based on our survey. From a procedural 
perspective, rail regulation by boards (rather than individuals) is becoming more prevalent across 
Europe, and in general the use of fixed term appointments further enhances independence by reducing 
the scope for regulatory capture. It is also the case that many regulators have developed considerable 
expertise and longevity, backed by increased staff numbers and resourcing. Regulators are also found 
generally to be able to produce legally binding decisions and impose penalties. All of the above 
contribute to ensure the stability, predictability and transparency of rail regulation in Europe.  
It is also clear that regulators are responding quickly to complaints and that non-
discriminatory access is not considered to be a problem either by regulators or the railway 
undertakings questioned. This suggests that, in principle, those markets which are currently open to 
competition should be offering a level playing field to new entrants. As a caveat to this point, our 
survey did not cover new entrants, who may have offered an alternative perspective; though we note 
that whilst regulators respond to complaints quickly, they have received very few in general. This 
finding further supports the existence of a level playing field within European railways, where 
competition is permitted.  
  
24 
 
Of course, most passenger markets are not currently open to competition, with direct awards 
for public service contracts the dominant method in most countries; though this is expected to change 
with forthcoming legislation (the governance and market opening pillars of the 4th Railway package). 
However, currently, where competitive tendering is carried out, regulators are not playing a 
significant role in that process. 
There are two, additional and key aspects where it appears that the regulatory role is not well 
developed in general across Europe. Firstly, and surprisingly, despite the legislative requirement for 
economic regulators to ensure that track access charges comply with the principles of the Recast, the 
regulatory role seems to be generally reserved only for dealing with complaints. Secondly, although 
the Recast sets out the possibility for regulators to play an important role in regulating the efficiency 
and quality performance of infrastructure managers, this happens only rarely. In the main, the 
efficiency, financial equilibrium and quality of infrastructure managers is addressed by multi-annual 
contracts between the companies and government. We consider that there could be considerable 
benefits from having this role played by an independent regulatory body, as occurs in economic 
regulation of other sectors (e.g. utilities in the UK and elsewhere). 
In conclusion, whilst there are many positive aspects, we see that rail economic regulators in 
Europe could be playing a much greater role in regulating the efficiency and quality of infrastructure 
managers, and potentially taking a greater role in the designing stages of passenger market opening. 
Approval of track access charges is a key role where regulators appear to be reactive, rather than 
proactive in general. Finally, some of the positive trends on regulatory boards and resourcing of 
regulators need to be reinforced and see wider diffusion. A key area for future research lies in seeking 
a deeper understanding of the interdependencies between railway structure, competition and economic 
regulation. This future research strand may clarify why ideal rail regulatory practices are more or less 
implemented in certain countries, which is key to justifying the appropriate resources for rail 
regulatory activities across Europe. 
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